openclaw security
Security tools (audit + optional fixes).
Related:
- Security guide: Security
Audit
session.dmScope="per-channel-peer" (or per-account-channel-peer for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes.
It also warns when small models (<=300B) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
For webhook ingress, it warns when hooks.defaultSessionKey is unset, when request sessionKey overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes.
It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when gateway.nodes.denyCommands uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when global tools.profile="minimal" is overridden by agent tool profiles, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
It warns when gateway.auth.mode="none" leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (/tools/invoke plus any enabled /v1/* endpoint).
JSON output
Use--json for CI/policy checks:
--fix and --json are combined, output includes both fix actions and final report:
What --fix changes
--fix applies safe, deterministic remediations:
- flips common
groupPolicy="open"togroupPolicy="allowlist"(including account variants in supported channels) - sets
logging.redactSensitivefrom"off"to"tools" - tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files (
credentials/*.json,auth-profiles.json,sessions.json, session*.jsonl)
--fix does not:
- rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
- disable tools (
gateway,cron,exec, etc.) - change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
- remove or rewrite plugins/skills